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One of the most controversial topics in recent economic literature concerns the determinants of the real exchange rate. In spite of the lack of 
theoretical consensus on how to determine the real exchange rate, empirical literature has shown that exchange rate overvaluation has negative 
effects on long-term economic growth. This paper theoretically discusses and empirically analyses these determining factors of the real exchange 
rate in Brazil in the 2000s. The Brazilian economy has shown a tendency of real overvaluation of its currency since high inflation was controlled 
in the mid-1990s. This tendency has only been interrupted by occasional internal or external shocks. Our empirical study is a modified version of 
the  econometric  model  proposed  by  Razin  and  Collins  (1999).  Like  these  authors,  our  theoretical  and  empirical  models  break  down  the 
determining factors of the actual real exchange rate into long-term and short-term factors. However, while Razin and Collins (1999) assume that 
deviations of the real exchange rate from its long-term trend are caused by short-term shocks, we assume that they are influenced by the direct 
and indirect impacts of short-term economic policy. Most of the our econometric results concerned with estimating the real exchange rate in 
Brazil  in  the  1999-2010  period  corresponded  to  those  expected,  according  to  the  theoretical  literature.  Even  taking  into  account  that  our 
econometric estimation is based on monthly data, the results showed that for more than 55% of the period the Brazilian real exchange rate was 
overvalued. The  empirical  evidence  also showed that Brazil’s risk premium, the stock of international reserves and the  lagged  differential 
between Brazilian and foreign short-term interest rates reveal the  most significant level,  explaining the  real  overvaluation  of the Brazilian 





Apesar de não haver consenso teórico sobre a determinação da taxa de câmbio real, a literatura empírica tem mostrado que uma tendência 
contínua de sobrevalorização da moeda de um país em termos reais tem efeitos negativos sobre o crescimento econômico de longo prazo. Este 
artigo analisa teórica e econometricamente os determinantes e o nível de desalinhamento da taxa de câmbio real no Brasil no período 1999-2010.  
Os dados observados revelam que, desde a eliminação da inflação crônica, em meados da década de 1990, a economia brasileira tem mostrado 
uma tendência à sobrevalorização de sua taxa de câmbio real. Esta tendência só tem sido interrompida por choques internos ou externos. Nosso 
estudo empírico é uma versão modificada do modelo econométrico proposto por Razin e Collins (1999). Assim como estes autores, nossos 
modelos teórico e empírico separam os determinantes da taxa de câmbio real nos componentes de curto prazo e de longo prazo. No entanto, 
enquanto Razin e Collins (1999) assumem que os desvios da taxa de câmbio real de sua tendência de longo prazo são causados por choques de 
curto prazo,  nós assumimos que os desvios são influenciados pelos impactos diretos e indiretos decorrentes da política econômica de curto prazo. 
Os principais resultados econométricos referentes ao Brasil no período 1999-2010 corresponderam ao esperado de acordo com a literatura teórica. 
Mesmo levando em consideração que nossa estimação econométrica é baseada em dados mensais, os resultados mostraram que a taxa de câmbio 
real ficou sobrevalorizada em 55% do período analisado. As evidências empíricas também mostraram que o prêmio de risco-Brasil, o estoque de 
reservas internacionais e o diferencial entre as taxas de juros interna e externa, com defasagem temporal de 1 mês, foram as variáveis mais 
significativas para explicar a sobrevalorização real da moeda brasileira. Com base nesses resultados, analisamos os principais dilemas de política 
econômica a serem enfrentados, e fazemos algumas sugestões de política que permitam a correção do desalinhamento da taxa de câmbio real no 
Brasil.  
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One of the most controversial topics in recent economic literature is about the determinants of the real 
exchange rate. At least two alternative theories dispute arguments about how to establish the long-term real 
exchange rate and what causes exchange rate misalignments. On the one hand, the theory of purchasing 
power parity (PPP), which defines the real exchange rate between two countries as the relative price of a 
common basket of goods converted into a same numeraire, predicts that this ratio should equal to 1 in the 
long run, in the absence of any short-term disturbance. On the other hand, Williamson (1983), in the mid-
1980s,  proposed  an  alternative  concept  of  real  exchange  rate  denoted  by  the  fundamental  equilibrium 
exchange rate (FEER). The FEER is referred to as the real exchange rate that is consistent with a sustainable 
current account balance, while the economy is growing at its “natural” rate.  
In spite of the lack of theoretical consensus on how to determine the real exchange rate, empirical 
literature has shown that exchange rate overvaluation has negative effects on the long-term economic growth 
(Razin and Collins, 1999; Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian, 2006; Dollar and Kraay, 2003). Rodrik (2008) 
and Berg and Miao (2009) went beyond and showed empirical evidence that not only does overvaluation 
damage growth but also that undervaluation benefits growth. In a survey on theory and empirical evidence on 
exchange rate economics, Williamson (2008) suggests that “the very best policy (in terms of maximizing 
growth) appears to be a small undervaluation” (p. 14, italics from the original) and concludes: “The evidence 
that overvaluation hurts development is now sufficiently strong to merit being reflected in policy, including 
delay  to  capital  account  liberalization  where  it  appears  likely  to  threaten  overvaluation”  (p.  24).  By 
estimating the statistical relationship between the real exchange rate and growth in Brazil in the period 1996-
2009, Barbosa et. al. had a more moderate conclusion. Their results showed that, depending on the initial 
condition, both a real depreciation and a real appreciation can have a negative effect on growth. However, 
since they found that the best real exchange rate that corresponded to the highest growth in the period under 
analysis was 101.6, in practice this means that the optimal real exchange rate is that which is consistent with 
a small real undervaluation, as suggested by Williamson (2008).  
Yet,  one  of  the  main  implications  of  the  Mundell-Fleming  model is that  small  economies  under 
flexible exchange rate regime and free capital mobility face greater volatility in their nominal exchange rate. 
Indeed, since over short periods nominal exchange rates are highly volatile and nominal prices are rigid, 
there is evidence that nominal and real exchange rates are correlated almost one to one in the short-term 
(Flood  and  Rose,  1995).  Also,  as  suggested  by  the  “original  sin”  proposition,  the  foreign  indebtedness 
process of developing economies involves a mismatch between the value of assets and of obligations, which 
might induce indebted countries to accept exchange rate overvaluation in order to reduce the burden of 
foreign  debt,  and/or  to  reduce  exchange  rate  risk.  These  characteristics  of  developing  economies  under 
flexible exchange rate regime and large capital flows tend to reduce their policy space, that is to say, the 
ability  to  use  macroeconomic  policies  counter-cyclically.  As  Aizenman,  Chinn  and  Ito  (2010)  show, 
emerging  Asian  countries  have  been  relatively  successful  in  reducing  high  volatility  of  their  nominal 
exchange rate by purchasing large amounts of international reserves. However, the room to manoeuvre in this 
area is very limited in Brazil because, in virtue of continuing high interest rates, the cost of sterilizing the 
monetary impact of the purchasing of international reserves by the Central Bank has negative impacts on 
gross public debt.   
Brazilian currency has shown a real overvaluation trend since inflation was controlled in the mid-
1990s. After 2003, this trend has become stronger, and it has intensified since the aftermath of the 2008 
international  financial  crisis,  given  the  increase  in  the  capital  flow  from  advanced  economies  into  fast 
growing emerging economies. Actually, this trend has only been interrupted by either internal or external 
shocks, such as at the end of 1998 (an speculative attack against the unsustainable semi-fixed exchange rate   3 
regime with large capital mobility), in the mid-2002 (because of the negative expectations from markets on 
the possibility of the victory of a particular candidate to the Presidency of Brazil, then evaluated as leftist) 
and  in  the  aftermath  of  the  global  crisis  in  September  2008.  The  foreign  scenario  of  increased  capital 
volatility in a world financially integrated exacerbates the trilemma of economic policy for Brazilian policy-
makers, that is to say, the difficulty of balancing competing objectives of economic policy: price stability, 
exchange rate stability and free capital mobility.  
To shed some light on how to reach the mix of policies that would allow for the increase in policy 
space, our aim in this paper is to propose an econometric model that captures the main determinants of the 
real exchange rate in Brazil in the 2000s. Our empirical study, which covers the period 1999-2010 and uses 
monthly  data  in  the  econometric  implementation,  is  a  modified  version  of  the  econometric  model  first 
presented by Razin (1996) and summarized by Razin and Collins (1999). The econometric specification is 
useful not only to capture the main determinants of the real exchange rate overvaluation trend, but also to 
measure the level of misalignment. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
discusses the theory of the real exchange rate determination and proposes a theoretical model which explains 
the determinants of the long-term real exchange rate and the short-term factors that cause the actual real 
exchange rate to deviate from its long-term trend. Section 3 analyses the economic policy dilemmas that 
policy-makers have to face in order to avoid large real exchange rate misalignments in an economy with a 
floating  exchange  rate  regime  and  free  capital  mobility.  Section  4  shows  the  main  econometric  results. 
Section 5 draws the main conclusions and makes some policy suggestions for Brazil.    
 
2. Real exchange rate: theoretical determinants and causes of misalignments 
 
  At  least  two  theories  compete  for  offering  the  most  convincing  hypothesis  to  explain  both  the 
determinants of the real exchange rate equilibrium in the long term and the causes of deviations of this trend 
in  the  very  short  term:  the  theories  of  purchasing  power  parity  (PPP)  and  the  fundamental  equilibrium 
exchange rate (FEER).  The theory of purchasing power parity (PPP), which defines the real exchange rate as 
the relative price of a common basket of goods traded between two countries (denoted here as, country 1 and 
country 2) converted into the same numeraire,  predicts that in an ideal world without any nominal price 
rigidity, transport cost, trade barriers or other short term disturbance that ratio should equal to 1. Every time 
relative price level P1/P2 rises, we say that country 1 experienced a real exchange rate appreciation. This is 
the absolute version of the PPP theory, whose basic assumption is that the goods that compose the common 
basket are completely identical. Since this assumption is very difficult to hold in the real world, the more 
accepted version is the relative version of the PPP theory, which assures that the equilibrium real exchange 
rate can be kept if the nominal exchange rate is adjusted by the differences in inflation rates in the countries 
considered over a given period.  In this sense, the real exchange rate can be defined as 
 
   
                                                                                                                                             (1) 
 
where qt is the real exchange rate; 
et is the nominal exchange rate  (defined as the domestic currency price of foreign currency); 
pt and pt* are the domestic and foreign price levels, respectively. 
 
This definition implies that a fall in both nominal and real exchange rates means an appreciation. In a 
survey on the PPP theory, Taylor and Taylor (2004) showed that, except for countries facing very high 
inflation rates, even the relative PPP theory does not hold in the short term. However, after the diversity of 
empirical work published from the 1990s on, there is now (more than in the past) sound evidence that the 
PPP  holds  in  the  long  term.  They  also  remind  us  that  this  evidence  became  more  convincing  after 
econometric studies incorporated nominal rigidities into the models and show the impact of both monetary 
*
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shocks and short-term economic policy on the deviations of actual real exchange rates from their long-term 
trend. However, Taylor and Taylor (2004) stressed that the empirical studies have shown a strong reversion 
of the real exchange rate equilibrium through time. Then, a condition for an econometric study that does not 
show a biased result is to incorporate variables that can capture structural change of the economy, such as 
both the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect and the terms of trade. The former refers to a tendency for 
countries which show higher changes in productivity of tradable goods compared with non-tradable ones to 
have higher price levels, that is to say, a real exchange rate appreciation. As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) 
concluded “the famous prediction of the Balassa-Samuelson proposition is that price levels tend to rise (that 
is, the real exchange rate over time tends to appreciate) with country per capita income”. The terms of trade 
is another important variable associated with changes in the long-term equilibrium of the real exchange rate 
and it is related to traditional trade theory. As showed by Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977), given 
some very restrictive conditions (constant returns to scale, perfect competition in the market of goods and 
factors, etc.), free trade implies that the relative price of export goods in a country tends to increase related to 
its import goods, that is to say, tends to improve its terms of trade.  Then, an improvement of long run terms 
of trade is associated with a real exchange rate appreciation
1. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  FEER  theory  was  proposed  by  Williamson  (1983)  to  connect  either  the 
medium or the long-term equilibrium real exchange rate (the so-called fundamental one) with the current 
economic policy. In this sense, according to Williamson (2008) “a FEER involved an exchange rate that is 
indefinitely sustainable  on the basis of existing policies.  It should be one to  generate  a current account 
surplus or deficit that matched the country´s underlying capital flow over the cycle, assuming that the country 
is pursuing internal balance as best as it can and that it is not restricting trade for balance-of-payments 
reasons” (p.2).  
There are many empirical works that estimated the determinants of real exchange rate misalignments 
based exclusively on PPP theory (see, for instance, Frankel and Rose, 1995; Coakley et al., 2004; Rodrik, 
2008) and others that did the same estimation based on the FEER theory (Williamson, 1995, 2008; Aguirre 
and Calderon, 2006; Cristiansen et al., 2009).  However, as it will be shown ahead, since our model captures 
not only the long-term variables associated to the PPP theory, but also the short-term variables directly or 
indirectly influenced by the short-term economic policy which could (or not) reveal itself inconsistent with 
the long run equilibrium in the sense of FEER theory, we can say that it combines both the theoretical PPP 
and FEER frameworks.   
We propose a modified theoretical and empirical version of the model first presented by Razin (1996) 
and summarized by Razin and Collins (1999). Before presenting our modifications, it is convenient to show 
the  model  proposed  by  these  authors.  Razin  and  Collins´s  model  is  based  on  the  IS-LM  long-term 
equilibrium solution for a small economy producing only  a single traded  good, in which the short-term 
deviations from the long-term trend are only due to short-term real and monetary stochastic shocks. The real 
exchange rate is jointly determined by the following equation: 
 
 
                                                                                                          (2) 
 
where the (actual) real exchange rate qt in period t is jointly determined by two forces: the long-term forces 
related to structural changes in the economy and represented by the function gt ( ); and the short term real and 
monetary shocks, represented by the function ft ( ). They assume that g and f are linear functions. While the 
variables that composes the function g ( ) are only real variables (yt
s is the real output, dt is real aggregate 
demand and i* the real world interest rate), those that are incorporated into the function f ( ) are variables that 
represent short term real and monetary stochastic shocks (εm and εy are real and monetary shock variables, 
respectively). In theoretical terms, the solution for the qt is represented by a combination of the flex-price 
                                                 
1 For a formal treatment, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
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solution for g ( ), plus a linear combination of stochastic shocks f ( ). It is important to stress that in an ideal 
world in which all prices were flexible and there were not any nominal price rigidity or other short-term 
economic disturbances, the actual real exchange rate qt would converge to its long term trend represented by 
g ( ). Then, in the Razin and Collins´s model, the deviation of qt from its long-term equilibrium trend is 
explained by short-term economic shocks.  
  As Edwards (1995) pointed out, while the long-term equilibrium real exchange rate is determined by 
only  real  variables,  the  actual  short-term  real  exchange  rate  can  only  be  determined  by  both  real  and 
monetary variables. Then, since the component f ( ) means that nominal price rigidities are introduced into 
the model, Razin and Collins (1999) showed that the equation (2) can be solved by a combination of a jointly 
flex-price solution for component g ( ) and a full-fledged solution for the component f ( ), which incorporates 
the real and monetary shocks.  However, Taylor and Taylor (2004:18-19) argue  that deviations of the real 
exchange rate from its long-term trend are linked not only to real and monetary shocks, but also to some 
combination of monetary policy and price stickiness, which plays an important  role in the short-run volatility 
of exchange rates, and can actually amplify it.  Then, our theoretical modified model is expressed as: 
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where qt and the variables that composes the function g ( ) are the same of Razin and Collins´s (1999) model 
and represent the main determinants of the long-term equilibrium real exchange rates. The component  m (.), 
differently from those authors, incorporates the set of short-term variables stt that are directly and indirectly 
influenced by the short-term macroeconomic policy. Such variables are, for instance, the nominal short-term 
interest rate (given the world interest rate), the movement of short-term net capital flows, and the stock of 
international reserves of the Central Bank, among others. With such changes, when the theoretical model is 
expressed in econometric specification (see Section 4 ahead), we can not only capture the main determinants 
of the recent actual real overvaluation of the Brazilian currency, but also measure the misalignment level.  
Although this procedure is similar to that adopted by Rodrik (2008) and Berg and Miao (2009), these authors 
in  their  econometric  implementation  do  not  take  into  account  the  short  term  effects  of  macroeconomic 
policies on the deviation of the actual real exchange rate from its trend. Despite the fact that the model does 
not capture important characteristics related to the working of foreign exchange markets, such as the dynamic 
changes  and  the  forward  looking  behavior,  its  simplicity  is  attractive  enough  to  provide  a  useful  and 
comprehensive empirical implementation. 
 
3.  Macroeconomic  impacts  of  exchange  rate  misalignments  in  emerging  economies  and  economic 
policy dilemmas 
 
In open economies financially integrated and with free capital mobility, the exchange rate plays a 
fundamental role in macroeconomic policy as its level and volatility affect inflation, balance of payments, 
investment decisions and economic growth. As we have seen, economic literature on growth suggests that, 
unless the Balassa-Samuelson effect is considered, continuous real overvaluation of the exchange rate does 
not favor economic growth. Given this assumption, our aim in this section is to provide analytical arguments 
to  further  investigate  which  mix  of  short-term  economic  policies  would  favor  growth  strategies  with 
exchange rate stability. Our theoretical focus will be on emerging economies that face greater difficulty in the 
macroeconomic adjustment of the exchange rate, given their greater vulnerability to the external movement 
of  capital  flows.  In  a  regime  of  floating  exchange  rate,  emerging  economies  face  special  challenges  in 
keeping domestic and external equilibrium, which in many cases narrows their policy space. So, considering 
that the real exchange rate is a key variable influencing growth in the short and long term, and that its 
behavior in the short term is influenced by economic policy measures, our aim in this section is to discuss 
stylized facts that impair a wider policy space for emerging economies. 
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3.1 Flexible exchange rates with free capital mobility: the “impossible trinity” and issues for emerging 
economies 
 
As well documented in economic literature, the choice between alternative exchange rate regimes 
involves  a  trade-off  between  the  advantages  of  a  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  (either  of  fixed  rates  or 
administered rates) and the advantages of a flexible exchange rate regime. The first warrants the stability of 
the nominal exchange rate, an important condition for economies with a long tradition of high inflation. 
However, this benefit has a cost: the loss of autonomy of the monetary policy. Also, international experience 
in the 1990s had shown that emerging countries that adopted administered exchange rate regime and no 
capital  control  were  vulnerable  to  speculative  attacks  against  their  currencies.  Nowadays  most  of  the 
emerging countries adopt a floating exchange rate regime. 
In theoretical terms, a floating  exchange  rate regime  would allow for a  greater  autonomy  of the 
monetary policy, as it can be a solution to the ‘impossible trinity’. According to this proposition, it is not 
possible to keep a fixed exchange rate regime, free capital mobility and monetary policy autonomy and, at 
the same time, to provide a consistent solution to economic policy. Since a flexible exchange rate regime, in 
its turn, could guarantee monetary policy autonomy, and therefore low volatility of interest rates, this latter 
policy instrument could not be used to stabilize the exchange rate. In practical terms, however, given the 
great  financial  integration  of  the  economies,  monetary  autonomy  is  not  observed  (Grenville,  1998). 
Moreover, it should be added that recent international experience has shown that emerging countries actually 
intervene  in  their  foreign  exchange  market  in  order  to  offset  violent  movements  in  the  exchange  rate, 
configuring an intermediary exchange rate regime. 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue that systematic interventions in the exchange rate markets by central 
banks characterize a  “fear of floating” behaviour. According to the authors, emerging economies are more 
susceptible  to  live  with  exchange  rate  instability  due  to  capital  movements,  as  they  suffer  from  low 
credibility in their policies and institutions. Because of low credibility, monetary authorities are forced to 
increase interest rates more often, following the threat of a significant devaluation in the exchange rate. The 
positive difference between domestic and external interest rates would attract foreign capital, stabilizing the 
exchange rate.
2 However, in the case of Brazil, the “fear of floating” argument is misleading to explain why 
Brazilian monetary authorities are induced to augment the short term interest rate, contrary to the practice 
observed in other emerging economies, especially in Asian countries. As Silva e Vernengo (2009) argue, 
since the inflation target regime was introduced in Brazil in 1999, Brazil´s Central Bank has managed the 
monetary policy in a very conservative way
3. In practice, its only goal has been to keep the inflation low and 
very close to the targeted rate.  Silva and Vernengo (2009) conclude that, in the case of Brazil, rather than a 
“fear of floating” behaviour, Brazil´s Central Bank shows a “a fear of inflating” behaviour, meaning that this 
assumption would better explain the high short term interest rates differential. It should also be added that 
they show that the pass-through effect between the changes in the exchange rate and domestic prices in the 
Brazilian economy is low. Another alternative explanation for frequent interventions in the foreign exchange 
market in emerging economies is suggested by Prates et al (2008). The authors argue that given the financial 
globalization,  monetary  authorities  can  adopt  “defensive  strategies”  to  prevent  exchange  rate  from  high 
volatility.  These  strategies  would  imply:  a)  the  over  accumulation  of  international  reserves
4,  a  sort  of 
                                                 
2 This would suggest a positive correlation between exchange rate and interest rate variation. 
3 To give an example of the conservative manner in which Brazil´s Central Bank manages the monetary policy, after the burst of 
the financial global crisis in September 2008, Brazilian basic interest rate (SELIC) was kept unchanged at 13.75% per year until 
January  2009,  even  taking  into  account  the  recessionary  environment  in  Brazil,  the  low  inflation  rate  and  the  deflationary 
expectations due to the global financial crisis. For a comparison between the different monetary and fiscal policy responses from 
Brazilian and Indian economic authorities to the immediate aftermath of the 2008 global crisis, see Nassif (2010). 
4 As we will see ahead, this strategy has been pursued more aggressively by Asian countries than Latin American countries, 
including Brazil, in virtue of the high cost (in terms of augmenting gross public debt) of sterilizing the monetary impact of 
purchasing international reserves by the central bank.   7 
precautionary demand, in order to reduce external vulnerability and/or b) an incentive to grow led by exports, 
a ‘mercantilist strategy’. 
The above considerations imply that the choice of a flexible exchange rate regime, in practice, imply 
an intermediary  exchange rate regime. This means to say that the central bank interferes in the foreign 
exchange market every time it chooses to reach a macroeconomic goal. Considering specifically the foreign 
exchange market, interventions can be justified either to adjust the nominal exchange rate trajectory or to 
stabilize real exchange rate, reducing its volatility and misalignment.
5  
The success of the defensive strategies to reduce exchange rate volatility can be evaluated according 
to the policy space monetary authorities have to implement counter-cyclical measures aiming at increasing 
output and employment and reducing external vulnerability. This space is reduced when short-term economic 
policy has to be used to restore balance of payments equilibrium.
6 So, considering the implementation of 
short-term economic policies, the challenge to be faced by emerging economies financially integrated is how 
to avoid exchange rate volatiltiy and sustain growth with price stability.  
Aizenman et al (2010), discussing how emerging Asian countries are trying to reduce high volatility 
of  their  nominal  exchange  rate,  base  their  argument  considering  a  modified  version  of  the  ‘impossible 
trinity’. Their theoretical reference to the explanation about the loss of autonomy of the monetary policy in a 
floating exchange rate regime and free capital mobility is the well known Mundell-Fleming model. As state 
by the authors, “a country may simultaneously choose any two, but not all, of the following three goals: 
monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration. This concept, if valid, is supposed 
to constrain policy makers by forcing them to choose only two out of the three policy choices (p.2).” In this 
sense they present the trilemma of economic policy that implies the choice of a mix of possibilities among 
different degrees of autonomy of the monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention and capital mobility. 
However, Aizenman et al. showed sound econometric evidence that, since the Asian crisis of 1997, the Asian 
countries  have  been  well  succeeded  in  by-passing  the  “impossible  trinity”  by  an  aggressive  policy  of 
accumulation of international reserves. In other words, rather than a dirty floating exchange rate regime like 
most Latin American countries (including Brazil), the Asian countries have, in practice, an administered 
floating exchange rate regime. 
The logic of the Mundell-Fleming model states that the link between domestic and foreign sectors 
depend on the exchange rate regime, or, to put in other words, the choice of the exchange rate regime has 
implications on how domestic prices and balance of payments are kept in equilibrium. In a floating exchange 
rate  regime,  monetary  authorities  can  stabilize  the  domestic  price  level  through  monetary  policy  which 
should be efficient to guarantee domestic equilibrium. In this sense the implementation of the monetary 
policy should be independent of other macroeconomic goals, while the floating exchange rate regime and 
capital  mobility  are  responsible  for  keeping  the  balance  of  payments  in  equilibrium.  With  free  capital 
mobility, it is assumed that a flexible exchange rate regime will absorb exogenous shocks, without affecting 
the level of international reserves, and so making the country less vulnerable to exchange rate crises and 
speculative attacks.  
However, Mundell (1960) had observed that since the internal stability of the model with floating 
exchange rate and capital mobility depends on the manipulation of the interest rate, this latter instrument 
                                                 
5 For an interesting discussion about the “fear of floating” in Brazil after 1998, see Souza (2005). His main conclusion is that the 
Brazil´s  Central  Bank  intervened in the  foreign  exchange  market  in the  1999-2002 period to  avoid the negative  impacts  on 
domestic prices of external instability in the financial markets. In this sense Brazilian authorities would be more tolerant with an 
appreciation trend of the currency than with a depreciation trend. (p. 540) 
6 Bresser-Pereira and Gala (2006) argue that economies that have adopted a development strategy based on the absorption of 
external saving, had, in general, their space of policy reduced. The theoretical argument that supports such strategy, that is, the 
external saving complements internal saving to boost growth, does not consider the fact that countries that use external saving are 
not in the same position to negotiate their foreign debts with their creditors. This means to say that emerging countries must pay 
back their debt in the creditor’s currency, as their own is not convertible.     8 
affects  the  stability  of  domestic  prices  in  an  indirect  way.
7  The  variation  of  the  interest  rate  aiming  at 
controlling aggregate demand affects first the short-term capital flow, which, in its turn, affects the exchange 
rate which, in its turn again, is adjusted to restore the equilibrium in the market of goods and services and the 
balance of payments. In this way, in open economies with free capital mobility the transmission mechanism 
of  the  monetary  policy  occurs  through  the  exchange  rate.  This  occurs  because  the  sensitivity  of  the 
adjustment in the market of goods and services is inferior to the sensitivity of the changes in the capital 
movements to the interest rate.  
Besides  this  asymmetry  in  the  sensitivity  of  the  adjustments,
8  it  should  also  be  considered  that 
emerging economies have specificities which might make the adjustment mechanism become less efficient. 
These characteristics are: non-convertible currency, high volatility in the flow of capital and recurrent and 
persistent current account deficits.  
So, considering these characteristics, the operation of a floating exchange rate regime in emerging 
economies is often associated with a high volatility in the nominal exchange rate, which leads to systematic 
interventions in the foreign exchange market. As we have already mentioned, these interventions can be 
justified as a defensive measure to respond to the greater sensitivity of the emerging economies to external 
shocks, and does not necessarily mean a ‘fear of floating’. 
Obstfeld (2008) pointed out that, taking into account the short-term nominal price rigidities, another  
collateral effect of the flexible exchange rate regime with free capital mobility in emerging economies is that 
changes in the world demand for assets or domestic products are quickly translated into an overvaluation of 
the real exchange rate. According to the author:  
With an open capital account, the possibility of undesired real currency appreciation—and indeed, 
depreciation—is inherent in the trilemma. Because appreciations are associated with distress in the 
manufacturing sector and with current account deficits, however, it is these rather than depreciations 
that generally worry policy makers the most. (p. 38) 
So,  the  greater  volatility  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  in  emerging  economies  emerges  as  an 
additional difficulty in the administration of the trilemma of economic policy, and it is due to the fact that in 
these economies, in general, the balance of payments equilibrium depends on continuous flows of foreign 
capital. Under this circumstance, in order to attract foreign capital, emerging economies have to operate with 
high interest rates. The consequence of such conditionality is that high interest rates put pressure on public 
debt, and also it penalizes economic growth. 
The process of foreign indebtedness in emerging economies involves a mismatch between the value 
of assets and obligations. As assets are, in general, denominated in the domestic currency and obligations in 
foreign currency, devaluations of the domestic currency might cause dramatic losses in the stock of wealth of 
debtors in foreign currency. This sort of problem is known as the ‘original sin’(Hausmann, et al, 2000). 
Because  of  this  particularity,  when  external  liquidity  is  plentiful,  movements  towards  the  valuation  of 
domestic currency have a positive effect on the balance sheet of indebted agents in foreign currency, and the 
opposite effect is observed when international liquidity is scarce.  
Recent literature on capital and financial liberalization has shown that the specificities of emerging 
economies financially integrated in the world financial market has imposed on them situations that narrows 
their policy space. These situations can be described as stylized facts to orient our further discussion about 
what the causes of real overvaluation of the Brazilian currency are in recent times.  
                                                 
7 But notice that the internal stability is not achieved by the direct effect of changed credit conditions on effective demand: it is 
achieved instead by the indirect effect of changes in the exchange rate. (Mundell, 1960, p. 239).  
8 Also it should be noted that, since over short periods nominal exchange rates are highly volatile and nominal prices are rigid, 
there is evidence that nominal and real exchange rates are correlated almost one to one in the short-term (Flood and Rose, 1995).    9 
3.2 Some stylized facts about real exchange rate volatility and misalignment trend for emerging 
countries 
 
1 –Unstable expectations in relation to the exchange rate increases the spread of risk: The uncover parity of 
the interest rate (i= i
*+e
e) determines that the domestic interest rate, i, is equal to the international rate, i
*, 
plus the expectation of exchange rate depreciation, e
e. Any difference between i and i
* implies a variation in 
e
e,  that  should  equilibrate  the  rate  of  return  on  bonds.  So,  when  the  domestic  currency  is  expected  to 
depreciate (e
e>0), the spread of risk will increase. If a high instability in the foreign exchange market is 
observed, the threat of a depreciation puts pressure on the domestic interest rate to keep domestic assets 
attractive, and so an appreciation of the exchange rate is expected, as a response to the manipulation of the 
domestic interest rate by the central bank to avoid currency devaluation. The systematic increase in the short-
term interest rate differential represents an additional incentive to sustain the exceeding flow of foreign short-
term capital, especially that of speculative nature.   
 
2-  Excess  of  international  liquidity  attracts  foreign  capital  and  deteriorates  the  public  debt:  When 
international liquidity is plentiful and the inflow of foreign capital is in excess to finance balance of payments 
equilibrium, foreign reserves will increase. This increase, given the interest rate differential, implies financial 
loss for the country, on one hand, and an increase in the public debt, on the other, equal to that part of the 
reserve  that  has  been  sterilized.  Then,  policy-makers  face  a  trade-off  between  purchasing  international 
reserves to avoid a large real overvaluation of their currency and, since they have to sterilize the monetary 
impacts of that policy, absorbing this extra burden on gross public debt. 
 
3 – Appreciation of domestic currency deteriorates the net public debt ratio to GDP and has a negative 
impact on the country’s risk premium: An appreciation of the domestic currency implies that the value of the 
reserves  in domestic  currency  falls  worsening  the net  public  debt  ratio  and  reducing  the  central  bank’s 
financial gains. This implies an increase in the burden of the public debt and an increase in the fiscal deficits. 
According to Kregel (2006), central banks in emerging countries end up financing gains of foreign investors 
that borrow in their own markets to profit from the positive interest rate differential in emerging economies. 
 
4-  Depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  has  a  negative  impact  on  inflation:  If  a  depreciation  in  domestic 
currency is perceived as a threat to inflation control, monetary authorities may adopt an inflation targeting 
policy  to  reinforce  their  commitment  to  keeping  prices  under  control.  (Goldfajn  and  Werlang,  2000). 
According to Ocampo and Vos (2006), however, this commitment may lead economies with low credibility 
to accept overvaluation of their currencies, when international liquidity is plentiful and short-term terms of 
trade shocks are favorable. So, the relationship between the short-term interest rate differential and the real 
exchange rate can be interpreted as having different impacts according to the period under observation. . In 
the very short term, especially after the economy faces a  shock, this differential has a positive association 
with the real exchange rate, as the spread of risk might increase. However, in a longer period of time , the 
higher the short-term interest rate differential is, the more appreciated the currency will be in real terms. 
Needless  to  say  that  the  impact  of  high  short-term  interest  rate  differential  on  the  real  exchange  rate 
appreciation occurs through the transmission from the former to the increasing of short-term capital inflows. 
In practice, it should be noted that when the central bank increases the domestic interest rates to reduce 
inflation, the effect of this policy (given the external interest rate) on the attractiveness of short-term capital 
flow occurs with some time lag.   
 
 5 – High interest rates discourage private investment: When high short-term interest rates differential causes 
an overvaluation of the real exchange rate, real wages tend to increase. Then, a consumer-led growth implies 
an increase in imports of consumer goods and so increases competition with domestic production. In this 
case,  domestic  prices  might  fall  or  slow  down,  and  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates,  decreasing  the   10 
competitiveness of exports. So, it seems that there is a vicious cycle between high short-term interest rates 
differential, real exchange rate overvaluation, low inflation and, again, real exchange rate overvaluation. 
In sum, the widening of the policy space implies an adjustment in the two key prices of the economy 
– interest rate and exchange rate. This adjustment must allow for the expansion of aggregate demand, in 
particular of exports, in order to relax external restriction to growth. In general, the economic policy dilemma 
to be faced by emerging economies in the short term can be summarized in how much the exchange rate 
misalignment will affect domestic prices, the level of aggregate demand and the burden on foreign debt 
commitments, in particular, on public debt. The best combination of these fundamental prices will help in the 
solution of the economic policy trilemma, and, consequently, in the widening of the space of policy. 
 
4. Real exchange rate overvaluation: empirical evidence for Brazil in the 2000s 
 
Our aim in this section is to investigate empirically the determinants of the real exchange rate in 
Brazil after the implementation of the flexible exchange rate regime in January 1999. The Brazilian currency 
is presenting a trend towards overvaluation of its real exchange rate ever since inflation became controlled in 
the mid-1990s. The stabilization plan launched in 1994 was based on a fixed exchange rate regime, which 
was  abandoned  in  January  1999,  following  the  speculative  attacks  against  most  currencies  of  emerging 
countries in the second half of the 1990s.  
The phase of flexible exchange rate regime that was implemented with an inflation targeting policy 
did not bring stability to the real exchange rate. Mostly after 2004, the trend towards real appreciation of the 
Brazilian currency, the Real became a dominant pattern, which has been intensified in the aftermath of the 
2008 international financial crisis.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the real exchange rate from February 1999 to February 2010. At least 
3 distinct phases can be identified, showing different behaviors of the real exchange rate. It is convenient to 
stress that this division took into account not only the actual trajectory of the real exchange rate, but also the 
calculated standard deviation in each phase.
  9  The first phase is characterized by a sharp depreciation in 
exchange  rate  in  the  months  immediately  after  the  change  in  the  Brazilian  exchange  rate  regime.  The 
fluctuation of the real exchange rate in 1999 was followed by a relatively stable evolution in 2000, when the 














                                                 
9 Considering the standard deviation and the trajectory of the evolution of the real exchange rate, we divided the phases as follows: 
Phases of the evolution of the Brazilian real exchange rate  Standard 
deviation 
Real exchange rate trend 
 
From February 1999 to December 2000  6.7  Relative stability 
From January 2001 to May 2004  16.8  Real depreciation trend 
From June 2004 to February 2010  16.6  Real appreciation trend 
   11 
Figure 1: Real effective exchange rate (monthly data): Brazil 1999-2010 
2000 average real exchange rate = 100 
 
                     














                                Source: Brazil´s Central Bank 
 
After this short period of stability, the Brazilian currency showed a trend towards depreciation in real 
terms until mid 2004. The second phase in the trajectory of the real exchange rate was marked by the election 
of the first left wing candidate in Brazil. This political fact rose the degree of uncertainty among private 
agents,  which  reflected  in  an  increase  in  the  real  exchange  rate  volatility.  In  October  2002  the  real 
depreciation of the Brazilian currency reached its highest level.  
From June 2004 onwards, the real exchange rate showed an appreciation trend, except for the second 
half  of  2008,  when  the  international  financial  crisis  triggered  a  brief  movement  of  depreciation  of  the 
currency. The third phase of the real exchange rate evolution is characterized by a greater dynamism of the 
economy,
10 although higher growth rates tend to be associated with an undervalued currency. This is not 
observed in the Brazilian case in recent times. The expansion of the world trade, mainly after 2004, favored 
the  terms  of  trade  of  the  country,  allowing  for  growth  and  real  appreciation  of  its  currency  to  occur 
simultaneously. In the absence of capital controls, the excess of inflow of external capital put pressure to 
appreciate the Brazilian Real. 
Considering the whole period of analysis, the phase of stability in the real exchange rate represented 
less than 10%. This evidence suggests that the policy space in the Brazilian economy was reduced under 
flexible exchange rate regime and inflation targeting, although growth rates had shown a significant recovery 
after 2004. The situations described as stylized facts in Section 3 can be identified to explain high volatility 
and real exchange rate misalignment in the period under analysis in Brazil.  
In short, the change from a fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible regime in 1999 was followed, as 
mentioned, by the implementation of an inflation targeting regime, which in the Brazilian case relies almost 
exclusively on the manipulation of the basic interest rate (SELIC) as the sole instrument to control inflation. 
During the whole period, domestic interest rates were kept relatively high compared to the rest of the world. 
This implied that the short-term interest rate differential worked as a continuous stimulus to attract short-term 
foreign  capital,  which  strongly  contributed  to  real  exchange  rate  volatility.  Interventions  in  the  foreign 
exchange market aiming at controlling volatility and overvaluation, in general, tends to increase gross public 
debt due to the high cost to sterilize the monetary impact of purchasing international reserves by Brazil´s 
Central Bank. Also, as it is typical of emerging economies, the Brazilian economy suffers from unstable 
expectations about the value of its currency. This is due, in part, to external vulnerability, as its currency is 
                                                 




























 Real appreciation trend   Real depreciation trend 
  Phase 1   Phase 2  Phase 3
Relative
stability  12 
non-convertible. Finally, it should be considered that real exchange rate misalignment associated with high 
volatility does not favor sustainable growth, as changes in the relative prices blur long term expectations that 
guide investment in fixed assets. Moreover, a trend towards appreciation of the currency in an environment 
of relatively low rates of investment induces to de-industrialization.
11 
In sum, the foreign scenario of increased capital volatility in a world with a high level of financial 
integration exacerbates the trilemma of economic policy for the Brazilian policy-makers, that is to say, the 
difficulty of balancing competing objectives of economic policy: price stability, exchange rate stability and 
capital mobility.  
 
4.1 Econometric implementation 
 
4.1.1 The econometric model 
 
We  translated  our  theoretical  model  presented  in  equation  (3)  into  the  following  econometric 
specification:  
 
    (4) 
  
Like Razin and Collins (1999), we chose the most appropriate candidates to represent the variables 
associated with the changes in the  real  exchange  rate in the long term (variables within the first set of 
brackets on the right hand of equation (4)) and those associated with deviations of the actual real exchange 
rate from its long term equilibrium (variables specified within the second set of brackets on the right side of 
equation (4)). The variables of the model are specified as follows: q  is the actual real effective exchange 
rate;  Y  is  the  real  GDP  per  capita  in  U.S.  Dollar;  TOT  is  the    terms  of  trade;  LTKF  and  STKF  are, 
respectively, the net long term and short term capital flow expressed as a ratio to GDP; CC is the current 
account balance expressed as a ratio of GDP;  IDIFER is the differential of short term domestic (SELIC basic 
rate) and international (US Fed Funds) interest rates;  IDIFERt-1 is this same variable expressed with a lag of 
one period; IR is the stock of Brazilian international reserves; and CR is Brazil´s risk premium; εt is a random 
error variable; and the subscript t is the time reference (in our econometric modeling, it refers to month)
12. 
The variables chosen to represent the impacts of the structural changes of the economy on the shifting 
of long-term equilibrium of the real exchange rate are largely used in the empirical literature and they do not 
deserve additional comments (see, for instance, Helmers, 1988, Edwards, 1988, Razin and Collins, 1999). 
Yet our variables either directly managed or indirectly influenced by short-term economic policy are found 
dispersed in empirical studies, such as Meese and Rogoff (1983), Edwards (1988), Calvo, Leiderman and 
Reinhart  (1993),  among  others.  Anyhow,  the  short-term  variables  were  taken  up  from  the  underlining 
discussion in Section 3, which points out the difficulties emerging economies have in administrating short-
term economic policy, in an attempt to avoid real exchange rate volatility and misalignment.  
To model the relationship between the real exchange rate and its determinants, we first followed some 
econometric procedures
13. In order to check if the series are stationary, we first used the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF), Phillips  Perron and Kwiat  Kowski-Pillips-Schmidt-Shun’s tests, observing all variables in 
level and first-difference
14.  As these tests revealed that all variables were characterized by unit root in level, 
the presence of time autocorrelation could produce a loss of efficiency. However, since the variables are 
stationary in the first-difference, our next step was to test the co-integration among them. If the test revealed 
                                                 
11 There is an ongoing debate in Brazil on this issue. See, for instance, Nassif (2008) and Oreiro and Feijo (2010). 
12 The primary sources are described in the Annex 1.  
13 The entire database and results of the tests can be made available upon request to the authors. 
14 For details, see Greene (1997). 
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that the variables are co-integrated, the regression in level
15 could be done without showing spurious results. 
Then,  we  checked  the  co-integration  among  variables  according  to  Johansen’s  co-integration  test  (see 
Johansen, 1988), whose results are presented in Annex 2. These results allowed us to estimate the variables 
in level
16. The model was estimated according to the ordinary least squares (OLS) methodology
17. Table 1 
presents the results of our estimation. 
 
Table 1: Estimated model for Brazil 
Dependent variable:  real exchange rate 
 
Variable 
Description of the 
variables  Coefficient  P-value 
C  Constant  108.9616  0.0002 
Y  Real GDP per capita  -0.05681  0.0000 
TOT  Terms of trade  -0.100319  0.7302 
LTKF 
Net long term capital 
flow/GDP  -0.036412  0.2758 
CC 
Current account 
balance/GDP  0.264349  0.0000 
IDIFER 
Short term interest rate 
differential  1042.898  0.014 
IDIFERt-1 
Lagged short term 
interest rate differential  -739.4773  0.0759 
STKF 
Net short term capital 
flow/GDP  -0.01762  0.1943 
IR 
Stock of international 
reserves/GDP  10.79147  0.00070 
CR  Brazil´s risk premium  0.017594  0.00000 
 
            Notes: R-squared: 0.816873; Adjusted R-squared: 0.803364; Standard error: 8.072152;   
            Sum squared residual: 7949.476; F-statistics: 60.46731; Prob (F-statistics): 0.0000. 
           Number of observations: 133 
 
  The results show that our empirical model is relatively well fitted. In fact, the R-squared and the 
adjusted R-squared were 0.81 and 0.80, respectively. The structural variables of the model determine the long 
term equilibrium real exchange rate. As expected, the real GDP per capita presented a negative sign, as an 
increase  in  this  variable  over  time  implies  a  real  exchange  rate  appreciation,  according  to  the  Balassa-
Samuelson  effect.  The  terms  of  trade  in  our  model  presented  a  negative  sign  and  a  low  statistical 
significance. The sign is coherent with the literature discussed in Section 2, according to which a country´s 
terms of trade is a structural variable whose improvement in the long run tends to appreciate the currency in 
real terms. The net long term capital flow presented the expected sign, but also a low statistical significance. 
The larger the long term capital flow surplus over time, the more appreciated the real exchange rate. The 
economic importance of this variable for the long term equilibrium of the balance of payments in Brazil is 
the reason to keep it in the model. The current account balance was statistically significant and presented a 
positive  sign,  implying  that  a  positive  long  term  trend  in  the  current  account  is  an  indication  of  a real 
undervalued currency, as suggested by the theoretical literature.  
                                                 
15 According to Gujarati (2003), this means that the econometric model would not lose any valuable information. For more details, 
see Gujarati (2003). 
16 Annex 2 shows that we can reject the hypothesis that the variables are not co-integrated at the significance level of 5% See 
MacKinnon, Haugh and Michelis (1999). 
17 We run the Jarque-Bera test and confirmed the normality of residuals.    14 
  The variables associated to short-term economic policies are assumed to act as responsible for the 
deviations of the actual real exchange rates from their long-term equilibrium. The short-term interest rate 
differential, considered as a variable of policy to interfere in the determination of the real exchange rate, 
showed to be statistically significant. As we used this variable also lagged, the results can be interpreted in 
two  ways.  As  supported  by  the  analysis  in  Section  3,  the  very  short  term  impact  of  the  interest  rate 
differential  might  mean  not only  an  increase  of  the  spread  of  risk,  as  a  higher  short-term  interest  rates 
differential reflects the expectations of currency depreciation, but also a “fear of inflating”, given the context 
of  the  current  inflation  target regime  in  Brazil.  So  we  would  expect  a  positive  sign  in  the  interest rate 
differential, as shown in the model. At the same time, this increase in the spread of risk is reinforced every 
time the Brazilian economy faces either an internal or external shock, which, by provoking a sudden stop in 
capital flows, compels Brazil´s Central Bank to keep the  short-term interest rates differential positive and 
high. So, the incorporation of the lagged short-term interest rates differential into the econometric model is 
based on the assumption that the short-term interest rates differential impacts with a lag the real exchange 
rate  through  the short-term capital flows. This variable not only showed a negative sign, as expected, but 
also presented statistical significance.  
  The  net  short-term  capital  flow  showed  a  negative  sign  as  expected.  Despite  this  variable  being 
recognized by theoretical and empirical literature as having direct effects on the real exchange rate changes, 
its statistical significance was low in explaining the Brazilian real exchange rate. It is important to stress, 
however, that the main channel of transmission from the lagged short-term interest rate differential to the real 
exchange rate is through the impact of the former to the short-term capital flows. Here, it may be a problem 
of endogeneity between these two regressors that is not been treated in this paper
18.  
  The stock of international reserves showed a positive sign, and it is statistically significant.  It is 
necessary to stress that the relationship between this variable and the real exchange rate is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, the larger the stock of international reserves, the lower is both the expectation of real exchange rate 
depreciation and the country risk premium, considering everything else equal. If this is the case, the expected 
sign should be negative. On the other hand, a larger stock of international reserves also reflects a strategy of 
accumulating foreign reserves by the central bank as an attempt to avoid real exchange rate appreciation (a 
defensive strategy). Then, if this is the case, the expected sign should be positive. This seems to be the case 
of Brazil in the period under analysis. Brazil´s risk premium not only behaved as expected, but also was 
statistically significant. In fact, the lower a country risk premium is, the more appreciated its real exchange 
rate is. 
 
4.1.2 Construction of real exchange rate misalignments 
 
  For constructing our measure of real exchange rate misalignments, we followed similar procedures 
taken by Razin and Collins (1999). Thus, our misalignment measure can be obtained as follows: 
 
                                                                                             (5) 
 
  Thus,  a  misalignment  Mist  is  the  deviation  of  the  actual  real  exchange  rate  from  its  long-term 
equilibrium trend as estimated in the first part of equation (4). This result means that short-term misalignment 
is caused by the impact of short-term economic policy on the long trend trajectory of the real exchange rate. 
Figure 2 shows the estimated results for the misalignment levels in the Brazilian real exchange rate in the 




                                                 
18 It is important to remind that Razin and Collins (1999) recognized the problem of endogeneity between some of the variables 
used as candidates to represent the long-term determinants of the real exchange rate, but they also did not treat it in their paper. 
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                 Source: Estimated by authors according to procedures specified in equation (5). 
 
  As Figure 2 shows the estimated results reproduce with close accuracy the general trajectory of the 
real exchange rate in Brazil in the period under analysis. In fact, the Figure replicates with good precision 
two  general characteristics  of  the  Brazilian  real  exchange  rate behavior  in  the  last decade  in which  the 
economy has for the first time experienced a combination of a flexible exchange rate regime with high, free 
capital  mobility.  First,  the  episodes  of  sharp  real  depreciation  have  almost  exclusively  happened  as  a 
response to either internal or external shocks, such as those of between mid-2002 and early 2003 and of the 
second half of 2008, as already mentioned above. Second, and most important, the Brazilian real exchange 
overvaluation trend is confirmed in the majority of the period under analysis. According to our estimation the 
real overvaluation of the Brazilian currency was observed in 55% of the period. One could argue that the 
estimated period (10 years) is not long enough to configure a long term trend. However, as our purpose is 
rather  to  evaluate  the  short  experience  of  floating  exchange  rate  regime  with  high  freedom  for  capital 
movements, it would be misleading to incorporate the previous period in which Brazil combined either fixed 
exchange rate regime with capital controls (before 1992) or fixed exchange regime with high capital mobility 
(from 1992 to the end of 1998). 
 
5. Concluding remarks and economic policy implications 
 
In his classic paper, Dornbusch (1976) definitively showed that a fixed exchange rate regime with 
high capital mobility is not sustainable in the long term. His main argument is that, if real exchange rate is 
strongly overvalued, this increases current account deficits and also leads to a rapid growth of external debt, 
and this situation ends up putting the economy under a speculative attack. He also advised that an economy 
with relatively free capital movements should not choose a fixed exchange rate. The transition from a fixed 
exchange rate to a flexible exchange rate regime in Brazil in the beginning of 1999 is an example of what 
Dornbusch´s  model  advanced.  In  fact,  by  not  having  followed  this  author’s  recommendations,  the 









































































































































































2  16 
policy forced by markets, which was initiated as soon as the speculative attack that had began at the end of 
1998 generated an overshooting of the Brazilian exchange rate. 
  In the recent experience of a flexible exchange rate regime with relatively high capital movements in 
Brazil, policy-makers clearly face the challenges imposed by the “trilemma” of economic policy. So, how to 
overcome the “impossible trinity”, that is to say how to choose two out of three competing policy goals -  
monetary independence, exchange rate stability and high external financial integration – is in the current 
agenda of economic policy.. In practice, it is not an exaggeration to say that Brazilian policy-makers have 
pursued monetary independence to assure price stability and high external financial integration as priority 
goals of economic policy, and so exchange rate volatility has been tolerated.  
In our paper, we showed with descriptive statistics and econometric evidence that the evolution of the 
Brazilian real exchange rate has been characterized by high volatility and an overvaluation trend. This trend 
is  supported  by  our  econometric  estimation,  which  showed  that  the  real  overvaluation  of  the  Brazilian 
currency was observed in 55% of the period 1999-2010. The econometric exercise also showed that Brazil´s 
risk premium, the stock of international reserves and the current and lagged differential between Brazilian 
and foreign interest rates reveal to be significant to explain the misalignment of the real exchange rate  of the 
Brazilian currency.  Despite the short term net capital flow being recognized by theoretical and empirical 
literature as having direct effects on the real exchange rate changes, its statistical significance was low in 
explaining the Brazilian real exchange rate. It is important to stress, however, as supported by theoretical 
literature, that the main channel of transmission from the lagged short term interest rate differential to the real 
exchange rate is through the impact of the former to the short-term capital flows. 
Aizenman et al. (2010) showed econometric evidence that, since the 1997 financial crisis, Asian 
emerging market economies have been well succeeded in damping the negative impacts of large net capital 
flows on the real exchange rate overvaluation through massive accumulation of international reserves.
19 The 
authors suggest that “policy makers in a more open economy would prefer pursuing greater exchange rate 
stability” (p. ii). Nevertheless, in the case of Brazil, our econometric results suggest that the most appropriate 
macroeconomic policy is to implement a mix of policy instruments.  
First of all, the policy space for avoiding the real exchange overvaluation through accumulation of 
international reserves is much more limited in Brazil than in Asian emerging market economies, because, in 
virtue of continuing high Brazilian interest rates, this strategy has adverse effects on the gross public debt.  
However, our econometric exercise showed that the stock of international reserves had a positive sign, and it 
is statistically significant. This means that, even taking into account that this strategy can increase the gross 
public debt, this economic policy mechanism has been relatively relevant in mitigating the real exchange rate 
trend. Then, as long as policy-makers are able to manage the impact of interventions in the spot foreign 
exchange  market  on  the  growth  of  gross public debt,  Brazilian  monetary  authorities  should  continue  to 
pursue the strategy of accumulation of international reserves.  
Since the short-term interest rates differential in Brazil figures as one of the highest in the capitalist 
world, Brazilian monetary authorities should enlarge the policy space for bringing the domestic interest rates 
to levels closer to international standard. One could argue that this possibility is very limited in Brazil, as the 
main concern of the inflation target regime is price stability. However, this goal is not incompatible with the 
effort of reducing the domestic interest rates. For instance, there are robust academic studies suggesting that 
the design of the inflation target regime in Brazil could be modified in order to give monetary authorities 
more room for reducing the SELIC basic interest rate. One of the recommendations is to manage the inflation 
target through a calendar year of 18 months (see, among others, Oreiro et al, 2009). 
Finally,  Brazilian  policy-makers  cannot  discard  the  use  of  more  effective  mechanisms  of  capital 
control as a relevant mechanism of economic policy if it is actually necessary. Taking into account that 
international interest rates might be kept at a very low level in the near future, due the stagnant environment 
in the world economy, the actually high short-term interest rate differential will continue to contribute to 
                                                 
19 For a critical analysis of the accumulation of reserves policy, see Cruz and Walters, 2008.   17 
appreciate the Brazilian currency in real terms. Although we agree that this would be an extreme instrument 
of economic policy, even a recent International Monetary Fund Staff Position Note (see Ostry et al., 2010, 
among others) concluded that “capital controls are a legitimate part of the toolkit to manage capital inflows in 
certain circumstances” (p.15). 
For at least two reasons real exchange overvaluation should be avoided: first, as has been strongly 
supported by the empirical literature, a large and continued overvaluation in the short-term can damage the 
long-term economic growth; and second, as stressed by Dornbusch (1988) a long time ago,  although a 
floating exchange regime can provide the correction of an overvaluation in the medium-term, the aftermath 
of a correction by free-market forces is far from being a “first best” solution because it is translated into 
severe macroeconomic instability and requires high adjustment costs: balance-of-payments crises, inflation, 
high interest rates and real GDP contraction.  
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Annex 1 – Description of the primary source of the variables 
 
Actual real effective exchange rate – estimated by Brazil’s Central Bank (http://www.bcb.gov.br). 
 
Real GDP per capita in US Dollar- estimated by Brazil’s Central Bank based on statistics on monthly real 
GDP in Brazilian R$ Real (series no. 4383) and transformed into US Dollar according to IPEA data series of  
exchange  rates.  Population  estimated  by  the  Brazilian  Institute  of  National  Accounts  (IBGE)  – 
http://www.bcb.gov.br 
 
Terms of trade – estimated by FUNCEX- FUNCEX12_TTR12 (http://www.funcex.com.br) 
 
Long term net capital flow – Balance of Payments, Brazil’s Central Bank.. 
 
Current Account Balance – Balance of Payments, Brazil’s Central Bank. 
 
Short term interest rates differential – difference between Brazil’s Central Bank monthly interest rate 
series for SELIC (BCB Boletim/M.Finan. - BM_T JOVER12) and the US FED FUNDS monthly interest rate 
(FMI/IFS - IFS12_TJFFEUA12). 
 
Short term net capital flow - Balance of Payments, Brazil’s Central Bank. 
 
Stock of international reserves – Brazil’s Central Bank (series no. 3546). 
 
Brazil’s risk premium (EMBI Brazil sovereign foreign currency) - Standard&Poors monthly series. 
 



























Data Trend: None Linear Linear
Test Type Intercept Intercept Intercept
No Trend No Trend Trend
Trace 1 2 1
Max-Eig 2 2 2
0 19.69318 19.74555 19.74555
1 19.5049 19.54244 19.48267
2 19.40562 19.42784   19.38305*
3 19.48422 19.50109 19.47157
4 19.59464 19.60504 19.58542
5 19.7499 19.74478 19.73251
Trace 0.05
Hypothesized no of CE(s) Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 137.7801 117.7082 0.0015
At most 1  78.13046 88.8038 0.2294
At most 2 39.37992 63.8761 0.868
At most 3 24.71069 42.91525 0.804
At most 4 13.28349 25.87211 0.7158
None * 59.64968 44.4972 0.0006
At most 1 * 38.75054 38.33101 0.0447
At most 2 14.66924 32.11832 0.9575
At most 3 11.42719 25.82321 0.9055
At most 4 7.173547 19.38704 0.8886
Note: Statistics generated in Eviews statistical software
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
 Johansen cointegration test for all variables I (1) model
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
 Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns)